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ARMSTRONG v. STIFFLER
court in Virginia with power to try such crimes as in the
instant case which occur on the river, can only be regarded
as a general recognition between the two states of Mary-
land's right which should not be disturbed.54
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT
CONTAINING LIQUIDATED
DAMAGE CLAUSE
Armstrong v. Stifler'
Specific performance was sought by the buyers of an
option agreement to sell ten shares of stock in a dairy
company at $300. per share. The contract, signed by de-
fendant, contained the following provisions: "In case of
default, I promise to pay $300. per share ... as liquidated
damages." Plaintiffs secured similar option agreements
from the holders of more than a majority of the outstanding
shares of the Company, with the purpose of securing control
of the corporation but holders of less than one-third of
such shares had transferred their stock to the plaintiffs,
the remaining optionors, including the defendant, having
refused to make the transfers promised. On defendant's
appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the bill of
complaint, held:-Affirmed; plaintiff's bill stated a case
justifying equitable relief.
Defendant raised two principal contentions in support
of his demurrer, viz:- (1) that a contract for the purpose
of securing control of a corporation is not specifically en-
6, On May 13, 1948, the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit,
reversed a judgment by the jury in the U. S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia which had awarded $56,000 in damages to the
victim of the crime in the instant case, her husband, and a fellow passenger.
The civil action for damages had been brought against defendants
Dichmann, Wright, and Pugh, Incorporated, operators of the steamboat on
which the felony occurred, who were under contract with the War Ship-
ping Administration. The theory of the case was that Dichmann as a com-
mon carrier owed to the plaintiffs as passengers the duty to use the
utmost or highest degree of practicable care and diligence in the selection
and supervision of members of its crew and the carrying of the pas-
sengers safely to their destination.
Following the U. S. Supreme Court decision In the case of Caldarola
v. Eckert, 332 U. S. 155, June 23, 1947, the Circuit Court of Appeals ruled
that the general agency contract between the United States which owned
the vessel and the defendants, specifically provided in Articles 1 and
3A(d) that the defendants were agents of the United States; that while
they were appointed to manage and conduct the business of the vessel, this
did not place them in the position of owners pro hac vice in possession or
control of the vessel so as to make them liable to the plaintiffs. Judgment
was entered exonerating the defendants of liability.
1 56 A. (2d) 808 (Md. 1948).
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forceable; (2) that the liquidated damage clause in the
contract defeated specific performance. As to the first,
defendant urged that in Ryan v. McLane,2 the Court had
indicated that a plaintiff seeking specific performance of
a contract to purchase stock control of a quasi-public cor-
poration came into court with unclean hands. The short
answer could, of course, have been made that in the instant
case, the corporation involved was not in any way quasi-
public. The Court, however, expressly passing over this,
pointed out that in the Ryan case, the language of the
opinion, while strong, not only fell short of characterizing
a purpose to secure stock control as being against public
policy per se, but specifically refused to do so, and based its
decision on facts in the case which were regarded as incon-
sistent with fair dealing on the plaintiff's part; the existence
of such facts, if present in the instant case, could be raised
by answer.
In denying validity to the defendant's second conten-
tion, however, the Court seems to have directly overruled
Hahn v. Concordia Society,' although apparently somewhat
chary of saying so in so many words. In that case, an actor's
contract not to perform in any production not under the
auspices of the plaintiff society contained a stipulation by
which, in the event of breach, the defendant obligated him-
self to pay a "conventional fine" of $200. The society sought
specific performance of the negative covenant by an in-
junction, relying on Lumley v. Wagner.' The Court, in dis-
cussing the doctrine of that case, pointed out that it had
overruled Kemble v. Kean5 and Kimberley v. Jennings,6
cases that had been frequently followed in this country,
as e.g. in Burton v. Marshall.7 The Court was obviously
hesitant to follow the lead of the English Court in discard-
ing those cases and equally hesitant to refuse outright to
accept the decision in Lumley v. Wagner; it consequently
seized upon the liquidated damage clause as a way out,
holding that by agreeing to pay a stipulated sum as liqui-
dated damages the parties had both fixed the amount of
damages resulting from a breach of the contract and had
also "indicated as clearly as if so stated in terms that the
only forum in which they could seek redress ... was a court
of law", being thereby precluded from seeking relief in
equity.
291 Md. 174, 46 A. 340 (1900).
a 42 Md. 460 (1875).
1 DeG., M. & G. 604 (1852).
6 Sim. 333 (1829).
16 Sire. 340 (1836).
4 Gill 487 (1846).
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In the instant case, the Court states that it is clear the
same result could and today- would be reached in the
Hahn case without reference to the liquidated damage
clause, because of the fact that the defendant there was
not "so exceptional a performer as the opera singers, base-
ball players and others to whom the doctrine of Lumley v.
Wagner has been restricted".'
Nevertheless, it was expressly held in the Hahn case
that a "stipulation to pay a specific sum as liquidated dam-
ages", in itself and without more, prevented specific per-
formance. And this principle was reaffirmed as late as
1922 in Rogers v. Dorrance. In the latter case a contract
for the sale of land, providing for deferred payments, con-
tained a stipulation that in the event of default by the
vendee, all sums paid on account of the purchase price
and all buildings erected or crops planted should be for-
feited and retained as liquidated damages by the vendor.
This was held not to defeat the vendor's right to specific
performance; but in a supplemental opinion filed on motion
for reargument, 10 the Court expressly disclaimed any inten-
tion to overrule the Hahn case, and went on to say: "It will
be seen that no definite sum or amount was fixed or named
in the forfeiture clause in this case, nor was it known what
payments would be made before a breach of the contract."
Since, in the instant case, there is an express agreement
to pay a specific and definite sum as liquidated damages,
it seems clear that the Court has directly overruled both
the doctrine of the Hahn case and the approval thereof in
the supplemental opinion in the Rogers case.
In doing so, it has brought Maryland into line with the
great weight of authority in this Country. It is generally
held that the right of specific performance, whether sought
affirmatively or as here by way of injunction, is not lost
because the contract is in the form of a bond with a penalty
attached or contains a clause for payment of a specific sum
as liquidated damages in the event of breach, unless the
contract can be construed as giving the defendant an option
to perform or to be released from performance on pay-
8 See, e.g., Rosenstein v. Zentz, 118 Md. 564, 85 A. 675 (1912) ; but ci.
Baltimore Baseball Club v. Childs, 1 Balto. City Rep. 169 (1891) and
Fulton Grand Laundry Co. v. Johnson, 140 Md. 359, 117 A. 753 (1922).
It has been suggested that it makes no difference whether the performer
is great or unknown; that any contract for personal services involves
subject matter as unique and irreplaceable as a contract for the sale
of land. Ashley, Specific Performance by Injunction (1906) 6 Col. L. R.
82, 91.
9 140 Md. 419, 117 A. 564 (1922).
10 Ibid, 427.
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ment of the stipulated sum." This is on the theory, as
stated in the opinion in the instant case, that such clauses
are inserted as means of securing performance and not as
an agreement to accept money in lieu thereof or as an ade-
quate substitute therefor.
Where equitable relief is sought because the plaintiff's
legal remedy of damages would be ineffective to enable
him to purchase articles similar to those contracted for
from other sources, or where the subject-matter of the
contract has unique values for the loss of which money
would not compensate, the majority rule followed in the
instant case seems obviously sound. Damages as a remedy
would be equally inadequate whether measured by a jury
or fixed by agreement of the parties in the contract.
So, in the instant case, the very stock contracted for is
necessary to the plaintiffs if they are to get the benefit of
their contract. Its value in money will not give .them con-
trol of the corporation, to secure which is their purpose
in contracting; nor can they with their money damages
purchase other similar stock on the open market which
will serve their ends in this respect.
Where, however, as is not infrequently the case,'2 the
inadequacy of the legal remedy arises, not from any
peculiar or special value of the subject-matter of the con-
tract, nor from any difficulty in replacing it with a similar
article on the open market, but solely because of the pres-
ence of conditions making damages in the event of breach
conjectural and difficult to measure, it is submitted that
there is some basis for regarding the presence of a liqui-
dated damage clause as defeating specific performance.
So in Martin v. Murphy,3 where the purchaser of a
doctor's practice sought specific performance of the seller's
agreement, not to engage in practice in the locality, by an
injunction to restrain breach of the negative promise, the
court, after saying that normally the plaintiff in such a
case would be entitled to relief, states :-
"This is upon the ground that, from the nature of
such a case, just and adequate damages cannot be
estimated for a breach of the covenant. The parties
:t RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, Sec. 378; POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
(5th ed. 1941) Sec. 447a; CHAFEE AND SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY (1934)
514; WALSH ON EQUITY (1930), 302. The cases are collected in 32 A. L. R.
584 et seq.; see also 98 A. L. R. 887, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 210, and 45 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 52.
12 See, e.g., Hendler Creamery Co. v. Lillich, 152 Md. 190, 136 A. 631
(1927) ; Eastern Rolling Mills v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 145 A. 378 (1929).
13 129 Ind. 464, 28 N. E. 1118 (1891).
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to such a contract may, however, by its terms agree
upon stipulated damages, which may be recovered
for a breach of its conditions, instead of leaving that
question open, uncertain and undetermined . . . The
sum fixed by the parties themselves in this contract
will, in the absence of fraud, be deemed to be adequate
and the proper measure of damages by the Court. '1 4
If we assume, as the Court does in the instant case,
that in the Hahn case there was nothing unique or irreplace-
able in the defendant's services for which the plaintiff
society had contracted, there could still have been difficulty
in estimating plaintiff's damages at law, except for the
presence of the liquidated damage clause, which fact might
in itself have been reason for decreeing specific perform-
ance. To that extent, the holding that the liquidated dam-
age clause defeated specific performance could be justified.
Consequently in saying in the instant case that such clauses
do not defeat specific performance, the Court has perhaps
laid down a rule broader than necessary for the decision
of the case before it. If damages as such are an adequate
remedy for the breach of a contract, and become inadequate
in a particular case solely because of the difficulty in esti-
mating them, it is not apparent why the removal of that
difficulty by the parties' own agreement through a liqui-
dated damage clause should not defeat any claim to specific
performance. No such situation is presented or considered
in the case before the court here.
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND REGULATION OF
SOUND AMPLIFICATION DEVICES
Saia v. People of the State of New York'
A city ordinance prohibited the use of sound amplifica-
tion devices "for advertising purposes or for attracting the
attention of the passing public or... so placed and operated
that the sounds coming therefrom can be heard to the
annoyance or inconvenience of travelers upon any street
or public places or of persons in neighboring premises".
1" See, to the same effect, Bartholomae & Roesing Brewing & M. Co. v.
Modzelewski, 269 Ill. 539, 109 N. E. 1058 (1915) ; and cf. Primm v. White,
162 Mo. App. 594, 142 S. W. 802 (1912).
168 S. Ct. 1148 (1948).
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